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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
1. Does ongoing, statewide pre-trial publicity 
arising from this Court's decision, resurrected from 
Defendant's conditional plea, effectively deny him a fair 
trial anywhere in Utah now, essentially limiting his remedy to 
standing on the plea and going forward with sentencing? 
2. Given that Defendant only has one realistic course 
of action left, to wit: standing on his plea and going 
forward to sentencing, after having confessed in reliance, of 
the District Court's promise to spare his life and with no 
objection from the State, is the remedy offered by this 
Honorable Court, under the circumstances existing now, so 
harsh as to deny Defendant due process of law, requiring 
additional relief therefore? 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
v. 
DOUGLAS EDWARD KAY, ] 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) Case No. 20265 
i Priority No. 1 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a Petition for Rehearing of the March 7, 1986 
decision of the above Court wherein this Court, after 
upholding the Defendant's position in many particulars, also 
upheld Hon. J. Harlan Burn's decision to not enforce the 
Conditional Plea agreement whereby Defendant's life would be 
spared if he would plead guilty to three counts of capital 
murder and four counts of aggravated robbery. 
Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
reconsider its decision in light of ongoing new pretrial 
publicity throughout the State of Utah, and consider whether 
same effectively denies Defendant one of the remedies offered 
by this Honorable Court, to wit: a jury trial, and whether 
the only other realistic alternative places Defendant in a 
position of no choice at all but rather of being forced to go 
1 
forward to sentencing on the basis of an illegally obtained 
confession, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees with the fact statement set out in 
State v. Kay, 29 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, P.2d , (1986), for 
purposes of this Petition. Defendant also incorporates herein 
certain representative newspaper articles, attached hereto as 
Appendix A and made a part hereof. Defendant further 
respectfully requests this Court to take Judicial Notice of 
the statewide and ongoing publicity of this case, as a matter 
of fact, pursuant to U.R.Ev. Rule 201(b)(1) and 201(b)(2), and 
201(c). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This Court's analysis in State v. Kay, supra, does not 
take into account the effects of on-going publicity, including 
resurrected, and often inaccurate and inflammatory, media 
accounts of Defendant's "horrifying tale" of "execution-style 
slaying," which publicity effectively denies Defendant 
meaningful access to a jury trial and/or a fair trial. 
With only one realistic remedy left, this Court should 
The Daily Spectrum, Washington County Edition, 
Thursday, March 27, 1986 p.3. 
2 
respectfully reconsider additional appropriate remedies, 
including specific performance of the conditional plea, 
particularly in light of the Statefs failure to object, 
thereby luring Defendant into not only a "chilling" 
confession but also into providing prosecutors with a road-map 
of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
In its appellate brief, Defendant stated at p. 41 that 
The cure in the instant case is to order the District 
Court to grant specific performance to Mr. Kay, not to 
compound error on error by depriving him of more of 
his fundamental freedoms by giving the State an 
unnecessary publicity tainted second bite at the apple 
in some other county.... 
Defendant was no less concerned about adverse 
prejudicial publicity on November 28, 1984, when his Appellate 
Brief was filed, than he is about inflammatory press coverage 
in March, April, or November of 1986, when he is headed to 
trial and/or sentencing. 
This Court, however, did not address the issue of 
adverse publicity denying him a fair trial in its decision, 
although in Part IV of its opinion in State v. Kay, supra at 
37, it did address "fundamental fairness" as applied to due 
3 
process and specific performance, but stops there, stating 
"[We] have considered Kay's other contentions on appeal and 
find them to be without merit." 
In light of statewide and inflammatary reporting of 
this case, including of this Court's own decision, Defendant 
respectfully requests this Court to (1) take Judicial Notice 
of such publicity and consider same, and (2) reconsider its 
conclusion that Mr. Kay can go forward to trial without 
prejudicial effect. 
This Court is also respectfully requested to take 
Judicial Notice of State of Utah v. Norman Lee Newstead, now 
before this Court, and of the statewide publicity that this 
case has generated to the detriment of Mr. Kay's ability to 
receive a fair trial, and in light of Mr. Newstead1s blaming 
Mr. Kay for the alleged murders in question in avoiding the 
Death Penalty himself. 
Without rearguing what has already been submitted, 
Defendant respectfully refers this Court to Appellant's Brief, 
IIC, at 38, for consideration in light of the new and ongoing 
publicity, and of the changed circumstances caused by Mr. 
Newstead's testimony. Defendant also argues that it would be 
unrealistic to assume that (1) the publicity will decrease, 
State v. Kay, supra, at 38. 
UTAH RULES OF EVID. Rule 201(b)(1), 201(b)(2), and 201(c). 
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objections by its failure fn raise l-hem at, the time the 
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CONCLUSION 
With life or death literally at issue, Defendant 
respectfully requests and urges this Court to review its 
decision in light of the improbability that Mr. Kay will ever 
receive a fair trial anywhere in Utah as a result of statewide 
media coverage which resurrects his initial confession, and 
which uses such inflammatory words as "horrifying" and 
"execution style". Defendant submits that no matter what 
precautionary or protective measures are taken, that this 
publicity—arising from a confession where the state waived 
timely objection—will follow Mr. Kay through jury selection 
and into trial, thereby denying him fundamental trial 
protections and rights. 
The Defendant certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith, for the reasons set out herein, and 
not for purposes of delay. 
Dated this r day o f / y ^ / , 1986 
HUNTSMAN 
Attorney ¥or Defendant-Appellant 
PHILLIP LANG POREMASTER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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Earl Dorius 
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Creighton Horton, II 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
231 East Fourth South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Supreme Court grants tiling extension in Kay case 
by Krlstine Messerly 
Staff Writer 
CEDAR CITY - The Utah Su-
preme Court has given attorneys for 
confessed Playhouse murderer 
Douglas Edward Kay an extension 
on the deadline to file a motion for a 
rehearing in his case, a court clerk 
said today. 
Kay's attorney, Clayton Hunt-
sman, was granted until April 1 to 
ask the court to review its March 7 
decision in which it remanded juris-
diction in the case back to 5th Dis-
trict Court for settlement, an exten-
sion of one week on the usual time 
allowed for such a motion. 
Huntsman said Wednesday he 
asked for an extra week to review the 
lengthy Supreme Court opinion in or-
der to decide whether a motion for a 
rehearing was proper. 
Should Huntsman choose to file 
motions in federal court asking for 
relief in the case, he would be re-
quired to have exhausted all possible 
state remedies — including the filing 
of a motion asking the high court to 
reconsider its decision. 
Motions for rehearings are rarely 
granted, but serve the purpose of giv-
ing the justices a chance to review 
and revise their opinion. 
Huntsman said he will ask for a re-
hearing if he decides there are 
grounds for asking for such a review 
— If, for example, he decides 
changed circumstances justify a re-
hearing, or if parts of the opinion are 
unclear or contradictory, requiring 
further explanation by the court. 
After more than a year's time for 
consideration, the justices, in a 25-
page opinion handed down March 7, 
denied Kay's interlocutory appeal, 
which had asked the court to enforce 
a unique plea bargain agreement 
struck between Judge J. Harlan 
Burns and Kay. Kay pleaded guilty 
to three counts of capital homicide In 
exchange for a promise that the 
would be sentenced to life imprison-
ment rather than death. 
After hearing a horrifying tale in 
which Kay described the execution-
style slaying of three victims during 
a robbery ofthe bar, Burns accepted 
the pleas without objection from Iron 
County Attorney Scott Thorley. 
Two weeks later.Thorley did ob-
ject, and after hearing argument on 
the propriety of the plea arrange-
ment Burns reversed his decision to 
accept the plea, ruling that the court 
was not bound to by the agreement to 
Impose life imprisonment and basing 
his ruling in part on the fact that the 
prosecution was suprised by the con-
ditional plea. He gave Kay the option 
of withdrawing his gulty pleas or pro-
ceeding to sentencing with the possi-
bility of being sentenced to death. 
Kay instead asked the Supreme 
Court to step in to order enforcement 
of the plea bargain. His attorneys 
also argued that the principles of 
double jeopardy precluded the option 
of setting the pleas as ; ide and forcing 
him to begin the process anew and 
that the trial court's actions violated 
Kay's rights to due process. 
The high court ruled the plea bar-
gain did violate procedural require-
ments of trial courts, but the viola-
tion * did not render the plea 
agreement invalid. "... We do not 
find that the trial court abused its 
discretion in declaring a misplea and 
ordering Kay to either face sentenc-
ing or to withdraw his plea of guilty," 
the court ruled. "The trial court 
found that the conditional plea was il-
legal." 
The high court did rule that a Mse-
ries of errors" took place when Hunt-
sman proposed the plea and when 
Burns agreed to entertain the plea 
without gaining the express approval 
of the plea by Thorley. 
The problems were "compounded 
by the prosecution," according to the 
Supreme Cout opinion. 
"A timely objection by the state 
would have prompted the judge to 
stop the proceedings and would have 
obviated the resulting problems," 
according to the opinion. 
The justices say in a footnote to the 
opinion that "we are deeply troubled 
by the prosecutions conduct" in not 
framing a timely objection. The 
prosecution raised objections "only 
after a new lead counsels ap-
pearance and after the defendant's 
open court confession had thoroughly 
inflamed the public." the justices 
say. 
Despite the series of mistakes by 
attorneys for both sides and by Judge 
Burns, the high court ruled that noth-
ing happened which violates Kay's 
rights to the point where further 
prosection of tne case should take 
place. 
In the majority opinion, the court 
ruled that "...the trial judge (Burns) 
was entitled to rescind his accep-
tance of the agreement under the cir-
cumstances of this case and neither 
double jeopardy nor due process con-
siderations bar the state from pro-
ceeding to trial." 
"Kay may either withdraw the 
guilty pleas that were given as part 
of the aborted plea agreement and 
enter new pleas br he may choose to 
stand on his guilty pleas and proceed 
to sentencing ... with no guarantee as 
to the sentence." 
Thorley would not comment on 
specifics of the high court opinion, 
but did say he was pleased at the sec-
ond chance to prosecute Kav. 
"We're pleased to have the oppor-
tunity to prosecute Douglas Edward 
Kay, which has been our object since 
March 1984," Thorley said. "Our de-
sire is to seek a conviction and the 
death penalty." 
Should the motion for a rehearing 
be denied, Kay will decide between 
the two options given him by the high 
court, Huntsman said. "He (Kay) 
has been told about the decision and 
knows his options," he said. 
